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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of the minimum wage on wage in-
equality, relative employment and over-education. Using an efficiency
wage model we show that over-education can be generated endoge-
nously and that an increase in the minimum wage can raise both total
and low-skill employment, and produce a fall in inequality. Evidence
from the US suggests that these theoretical results are empirically rel-
evant. The over-education rate has been increasing and our regression
analysis suggests that the decrease in the minimum wage may have
led to a deterioration of the employment and relative wage of low-skill
workers.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the effects of changes in the minimum wage on wage in-
equality, relative employment and the prevalence of mismatch (over-education)
in the labor market.
Studies by DiNardo et al. (1995) and Lee (1999) have suggested that
changes in the minimum wage and other labor market institutions have
been important for the observed increase in inequality. This claim has ob-
vious appeal. It is easy to see how these institutional changes may have
put downward pressure on low-skill wages. However, in a standard model
the change in relative wages will raise the demand for low-skill workers.
Contrary to this prediction, low skill workers appear to have lost ground in
terms of both wages and employment.
The simultaneous increase in the relative wage and employment of high-
skill workers has been interpreted as evidence of skill-biased technical change
(e.g. Levy and Murnane, 1992; Acemoglu, 2002). Other interpretations are
possible, however, and in this paper we use the theoretical framework in
Skott (2006) to show that a fall in the minimum wage can generate a de-
terioration in the position of low-skill workers, both in terms of wages and
employment. The presence of mismatch is central to the argument. As
shown by Sattinger (2006) and Skott (2005, 2006), relative wages and em-
ployment can move in the same direction, even in the absence of any skill
bias, if the prevalence of mismatch is determined endogenously. Induced
changes in mismatch, moreover, can contribute to an explanation of changes
in within-group or residual inequality.
To keep matters as simple as possible, we assume that high-skill workers
can get two types of jobs (‘good’ high-tech jobs and ‘bad’ low-tech jobs),
whereas low-skill workers have only one type of employment opportunity
(low-tech). Monitoring of workers’ effort is imperfect, contracts are incom-
plete, and workers cannot convincingly pre-commit to not shirking. One
solution is for firms to use the threat of dismissal as a way to elicit effort
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985). For this threat to work, both
good and bad jobs must be rationed to ensure that employed workers re-
ceive a rent over and above their best alternative. Good jobs pay more than
bad jobs, which in turn must pay more than unemployment. In equilibrium
there will be both un- and under-employment (some high-skill workers have
bad jobs that do not utilize their skills), and inequality between groups will
depend not only on the wage gap between good and bad jobs, but also on
the degree of mismatch. As long as some matches of high-skill workers and
bad jobs are sustained in equilibrium, changes in exogenous variables will
affect not only wages and employment rates but also the degree of mismatch.
These induced changes in the degree of underemployment of high-skill work-
ers lie behind the monopsonistic effects. An increase in the minimum wage
can reduce the employment of high-skill workers in low-tech jobs, and this
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deterioration of the employment conditions for high-skill workers relaxes the
no-shirking condition in high-tech jobs and stimulates employment.
Monopsonistic effects have been introduced into efficiency wage models
by Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) but our mechanism is very different. Rebitzer
and Taylor assume that firms have fixed monitoring resources, so that the
probability of detecting a shirking worker is decreasing in the total number
of employees. Thus, firms are forced to increase wages, and with them the
potential penalty of dismissal, pari-passu with employment. In other words,
firms face an upward sloping labor (effort) supply curve, and a binding min-
imum wage may induce an increase in employment, just as in the classical
monopsony case. Unlike Rebitzer and Taylor, we have two different types
of workers, and this heterogeneity, in combination with the presence of mis-
match, implies that monopsonistic features can arise even with exogenously
given probabilities of detection.1 In our setting, unemployment, mismatch
and monopsonistic effects are generated by the same efficiency-wage mech-
anism.2
The monopsonistic effects provide a link to another strand of literature.
The monopsony model, literally interpreted to apply to single buyer markets,
may have little relevance (for example see Stigler, 1946) but as argued by
Manning (2003, 2004), labor markets can be monopsonistic, even if there is
a multiplicity of buyers of labor. Indeed, the survey by Boal and Ransom
(1997) describes several alternative multi-agent models that lead to many of
the same conclusions as classic single-buyer monopsony. We contribute to
this literature by showing that efficiency wages can generate economy-wide
monopsony effects as well as skill mismatch.
The significance of the theoretical analysis depends on the degree of mis-
match. While measuring mismatch has proved challenging, studies suggest
that over-education is widespread in all OECD countries. Estimates range
between 10 and 40%, and the evidence also shows large differences in the
returns to education to different workers, depending on whether they are
over- or under-qualified for their jobs (Sicherman, 1991; Groot and Maassen
van den Brink, 2000).3 Combining data from the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles and the Current Population Survey, our own estimates in this paper
produce over-education rates of about 15–25% in the US, and the rate of
over-education changes substantially between 1973 and 2002 (the period for
which we have data).
Our theoretical model generates predictions for the effect of the mini-
1The model can be extended to include fixed monitoring resources, as in Rebitzer and
Taylor. An appendix with this extension is available on request.
2This is unlike the analysis in Manning (2003, pp. 256–262), where efficiency wage
elements and involuntary unemployment are added to models with monopsonistic features.
3Some studies have suggested that individual ability bias explains these results. Slonim-
czyk (2008), however, shows that differences in the returns to surplus and required quali-
fications persist when fixed effects are introduced.
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mum wage on unemployment, over-education, relative wages and relative
employment. We focus on estimating the relevant reduced-form equations.
We look at time series variation for the US as a whole and supplement these
regressions with panel regressions using state-level data.
This approach is unlike most recent empirical work on the employment
effects of the minimum wage, which looks at specific groups or industries
that are likely to be strongly affected, such as teenagers and restaurants
(see Card and Krueger (1995), Dube et al. (2007), and Brown (1999) and
Neumark and Wascher (2006) for surveys). Our theoretical argument, how-
ever, concerns macro effects on the entire labor market, and these macro
effects can not be captured by a partial study of employment effects for a
small subset of workers or industries. Nothing in our argument precludes
adverse employment effects in some industries or for some groups of work-
ers.4 The argument for positive employment effects in this paper is not that
the individual employer has monopsonistic power and therefore increases
employment and output in response to a rise in the minimum wage. Nor do
we rely on inelastic demand for the output of sectors with a high proportion
of low-skill workers.
The regression results are consistent with monopsonistic effects of changes
in the minimum wage. The coefficient on minimum wages is negative (but
not always statistically significant) in all time series and panel regressions
for the low-skill unemployment, high-skill unemployment and the degree of
over-education. The regressions also give the expected negative effect of
the minimum wage on the wage premium in high-skill jobs. The theoreti-
cal model and the presence of mismatch, finally, have implications for the
estimation of the elasticity of substitution in production, and this paper
provides the first estimates of the elasticity of substitution between high-
and low-tech jobs—as opposed to between high- and low-skill workers. Our
estimates suggest that the degree of substitutability between inputs may be
lower than indicated by studies that focused on skills rather than job types.
One obvious shortcoming of aggregate time series data is the small num-
ber of observations — in our case 30 years. The construction of a relevant
minimum wage also raises problems since some state level minimum wages
exceed the Federal minimum.5 Panel data improves matters in some re-
spects. The number of observations increases, the minimum wage can be
defined at the state level, and the non-binding Federal level in some states
4The model in section 3 suggests that an increase in minimum wages may lead to ex-
pansion of employment of low-skill adult workers (their no-shirking condition has been
relaxed), but the expansion may happen at the expense of both teenage workers and mis-
matched high-skill workers. This outcome would be in line with Neumark and Wascher’s
(2006) finding that an expansion of the earned income tax credits generate a displacement
of teenage women by low-skill adult women.
5Changes in the coverage of the minimum wage could also be a potential source of
difficulties. However, coverage was stable overthe period that we consider.
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— which is a problem in time series regressions — now becomes an advan-
tage. But endogeneity issues, in particular with respect to the relative labor
supply, lead to other problems.6 These limitations and problems imply that
the results should be interpreted with care.
The paper is in five sections. Section 2 describes the basic efficiency
wage model with endogenously generated mismatch. The effects of changes
in a binding minimum wage are examined in Section 3. Section 4 presents
the empirical evidence, and Section 5 concludes.
2 An efficiency wage model with endogenous mis-
match
There are two types of job and two types of workers. Jobs are either high-
tech or low-tech. Workers can be high-skill or low-skill, and the level of skill
is the product of past decisions to invest in human capital, which are taken
as given. Only high-skill workers can occupy high-tech positions, but both
worker types compete for the low-tech positions.
Firms maximize profits subject to a production function that has only
two inputs,
Y = F (NH , NL) (1)
where NH and NL are the total number of high- and low-tech jobs that
have been filled (with non-shirking workers). This specification assumes
that high- and low-skill workers are perfect substitutes in low-tech jobs and,
to avoid an extra parameter, that they are equally productive. There are
constant returns to scale.
The first order conditions with respect to the employment levels yield:
wH = F1(NH , NL) (2)
wL = F2(NH , NL) (3)
where it is important to note that the marginal products (Fi) correspond
to jobs. If Nij denotes the employment of worker type i in jobs of type j
(i = H,L; j = H,L) then NH = NHH and NL = NHL +NLL.
Following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), an employed worker of type i in
a job of type j gets a wage wij and instantaneous utility
uij =
{
wij − eij if not shirking
wij if shirking
6Changes in the minimum wage could also be partly endogenous (Card and Krueger,
1995; Autor et al., 2008). We address this issue in section 4.5.
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where eij is the worker’s disutility associated with exerting effort. Workers
are risk neutral and discount future outcomes at the rate ρ.
Firms set wages to ensure that workers’ best response is to exert effort.
Monitoring is costly, and shirkers are detected (and fired) according to a
positive but finite hazard rate (δ). The rate of job termination for non-
shirking workers (p) is also positive and finite. Discount and termination
rates are assumed constant across worker types.
These assumptions define three no-shirking conditions:
ρVHH = wHH − eHH − p(VHH − VHU ) (4)
= wHH − (p+ δ)(VHH − VHU )
ρVHL = wHL − eHL − p(VHL − VHU ) + qHLH(VHH − VHL) (5)
= wHL − (p+ δ)(VHL − VHU ) + qHLH(VHH − VHL)
ρVLL = wLL − eLL − p(VLL − VLU ) (6)
= wLL − (p+ δ)(VLL − VLU )
where the Vij are the value functions associated with each of the three em-
ployment states and qijk are transition rates for workers of type i in jobs
of type j, and transitioning into job type k. Equations (4) through (6) in-
corporate the assumptions that low-skill workers get only low-tech jobs and
high-skill workers prefer high-tech jobs (the transition rates qHHL and qLLH
are zero). If the no-shirking conditions are binding, equations (4)–(6) imply
that
VHH − VHU = eHH
δ
(7)
VHL − VHU = eHL
δ
(8)
VLL − VLU = eLL
δ
(9)
There are no unemployment benefits or home production, and the flow
of instantaneous utility is zero when unemployed. Thus, the value functions
for unemployed workers are given by:
ρVHU = qHUH(VHH − VHU ) + qHUL(VHL − VHU ) (10)
ρVLU = qLUL(VLL − VLU ) (11)
Using equations (4)–(11) and assuming that the transition probabilities
for a high-skill worker into high-tech jobs are the same independently of
whether the worker is unemployed or under-employed (qHUH = qHLH =
qHH), we can solve for wages:
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wHH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p+ qHH + qHUL
δ
+ (12)
+(eHH − eHL)δ + ρ+ p+ qHH
δ
wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p+ qHH + qHUL
δ
(13)
wLL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p+ qLUL
δ
(14)
Given the termination rates for shirkers and non-shirkers and a constant
supply of both types of workers (H,L), all transition probabilities (q) can
be determined through steady state conditions that depend only on em-
ployment levels. In a steady state, the unemployment rates and the rate of
mismatch are constant, and entries and exits from each of the employment
states are balanced. Formally:
qHH(H −NH) = pNH (15)
qHUL(H −NH −NHL) = pNHL + qHHNHL (16)
qLUL(L−NLL) = pNLL (17)
Using (15)–(17), the wage equations (the no-shirking conditions) can be
written
wHH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
+ (eHH − eHL)
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH
δ
(18)
wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
(19)
wLL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p LL−NLL
δ
(20)
The no-shirking conditions (18)–(20) define three distinct wage rates.
However, at an interior solution with both high- and low-skill workers in low-
tech jobs, we must have wHL = wLL = wL since otherwise profit maximizing
firms would never hire both types of workers. Trivially, wH = wHH since
only high-skill workers have high-tech jobs.
Equations (18)–(20) can be combined with the first order conditions
(2)–(3) to solve for equilibrium values of employment (NH , NHL, NLL) and
wages (wH , wL) in the absence of a binding minimum wage. Using (18)–
(20) it is readily seen that the two groups of workers will have the same
unemployment rates (uH = H−NH−NHLH =
L−NLL
L = uL) if eHL = eLL.
Empirically, unemployment rates for low-skill workers are higher than for
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high-skill workers, and we assume eLL > eHL. The same equations show that
the two unemployment rates must move together. From the wage equations
it follows, finally, that high-tech jobs pay a higher wage than low-tech jobs
if eHH > eHL;7 we assume this condition is met.
As shown by Skott (2006), this model can generate seemingly paradoxical
effects. Neutral shifts in the production function may affect the relative wage
and the relative employment rate of high-skill workers in the same direction
and, moreover, since it hurts the employment prospects of low-skill workers,
an increase in the supply of high-skill labor can lead to an increase in the
skill premium.
3 Minimum wages
Now suppose that a minimum wage w is established and that this minimum
wage is binding for low-tech but not for high-tech jobs. We are interested
in the effects of an increase in w on employment and wages.
With constant returns to scale and perfect competition, an equilibrium
must be characterized by zero profits. To satisfy this condition, an increase
in one of the wage rates must be associated with a decline in the other wage.8
By assumption the minimum wage is binding for low-tech jobs, and an in-
crease in the minimum wage must therefore reduce the wage in high-tech
jobs. Using the first-order conditions (2)–(3), the resulting decline in the
wage ratio wH/wL generates an increase in the employment ratio NH/NL.
This general result is independent of the wage equations. Additional results,
however, require assumptions about mismatch.
3.1 A standard model without mismatch
Without mismatch, the no-shirking condition for high-skill workers reads
wH = eHH
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH
δ
(21)
and the no-shirking condition for low-skill workers is replaced by the binding
minimum wage
wL = w (22)
Using (21), a decline in wH implies a fall inNH and since the employment
ratio NH/NL rises, low-skill employment must also fall. These results do
7A similar result could be obtained with equal levels of effort disutility but different
detection rates of shirkers (δHL > δHH).
8Assume that both wages at the new equilibrium were greater than or equal to wages
at the original equilibrium (with at least one strict inequality). In this case firms would
have been able to make positive profits at the original configuration of wage rates and the
initial position could not have been an equilibrium.
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not depend on the efficiency-wage formulation. The same conclusions apply
whenever the relevant ”supply” curve for high-skill labor is upward sloping
and independent of the minimum wage (a completely inelastic curve implies
that high-skill employment is unaffected by an increase in the minimum
wage while low-skill employment falls).
3.2 Minimum wages and induced mismatch
If the minimum wage is binding then, by definition, the no-shirking condition
cannot be binding for both high- and low-skill workers in low-tech jobs. It
may be binding for one or the other, but the minimum wage only has bite if
firms could fill a larger number of low-tech jobs with non-shirking workers
at an unchanged wage. We consider two polar cases. In the first case, the
no-shirking condition is always binding for low-skill workers; in the second
case it is always binding for high-skill workers.
In his study of wage setting behavior, Bewley (1999) found that overqual-
ified job applicants were common but that many employers were reluctant
to hire them. Indeed, this “shunning of overqualified job applicants” is
highlighted as one of two novel findings of the study (p.18). Attitudes to
overqualified applicants differed somewhat between primary and secondary
sector jobs, where secondary sector jobs are defined as short-term positions
that are often part time. Both sectors received applications from overquali-
fied workers, but for primary sector jobs 70 percent of firms expressed a “to-
tal unwillingness” to hire them, 10 percent were “partially unwilling” and
only 19 percent were “ready to hire” overqualified applicants (pp. 282–83).
Two main reasons account for the negative attitude to overqualifications: a
concern that applicants would quit again as soon as possible and a concern
that applicants would be unhappy on the job. Secondary sector employers
had fewer reservations, but only a minority (47 percent) “were ready to hire
them” with 30 percent being “totally unwilling” and 23 percent “partially
unwilling” (p. 324).
Bewley’s findings support our first case: they suggest that firms may
prefer low-skill workers in low-tech jobs if both high- and low-skill workers
are available at the same wage cost. Bu¨chel (2002), however, suggests that
“over-educated workers are generally more productive than others” and that,
because of this, “firms hire over-educated workers in large numbers.” This
claim would seem to support our second case.
3.2.1 Case 1: Mismatch with low-skill workers preferred in low-
tech jobs
When firms prefer low-skill workers in low-tech jobs, high-skill workers will
only be hired for low-tech jobs if the no-shirking condition is binding for
low-skill workers. Thus, the no-shirking condition for low-skill workers is
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satisfied as an equality while the minimum wage exceeds the expression for
wHL in (19).
Since the no-shirking condition for high-skill workers in low-tech jobs fails
to be satisfied as an equality, equation (8) no longer holds. Instead—using
(4), (5), (10) and wL = w— we have
VHL − VHU = w − eHL
ρ+ p+ qHH + qHUL
=
w − eHL
ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
(23)
and the no-shirking conditions for high-skill workers in high-tech jobs and
low-skill workers can be written,
wH =
δ(w − eHL)
ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
+
+(eHH − δ(w − eHL)
ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
)
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH
δ
(24)
w = wL = eLL
δ + ρ+ p LL−NLL
δ
(25)
Equation (25) shows that NLL will increase following a rise in the min-
imum wage, that is, low-skill workers will benefit both in terms of wages
and employment. This important result is quite intuitive. By assumption
the no-shirking condition represents the binding constraint on low-skill em-
ployment, and an increase in the minimum wage relaxes this constraint. A
higher minimum wage may also affect the number of low-tech jobs but that
has no effect on low-skill employment as long as some low-tech jobs are filled
with high-skill workers.
The solution for NH and NHL is not quite as simple. The high-tech wage
and the ratio of high-tech to low-tech jobs are determined, as before, by the
first order conditions (2)–(3), and the values of NH and NHL can be derived
using (24) and the definitional relation
NH =
NH
NL
(NHL +NLL) (26)
The effect of a rise in w on NH is ambiguous. There may be a negative
effect on the number of high-skill jobs, not surprisingly, but a positive effect
on NH can be obtained if NLL is elastic and an increase in wL generates a
large decrease in NHL. This possibility is illustrated numerically in Table 1.
An increase in NH is a necessary condition for other interesting effects.
The employment ratio NH/NL must rise, but with an increase in NH this
condition can be satisfied, even with an increase in NL. An increase in
both NL and NH , moreover, implies that aggregate employment must also
increase. These monopsonistic effects are made possible because a rise in
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Table 1: Employment and wage effects of changes in the minimum wage
when firms prefer low-skill workers in low-tech jobs
(L = H = 1, eLL = 1.3, eHL = 0.5, eHH = 2, Y = 5N
0.5
H N
0.5
L , ρ = 0.1, δ = 1, p = 0.2)
w NLL NHL NL NH wH Ω N wHAw Θ
1.7 0.03 0.58 0.62 0.29 3.68 0.64 0.9 1.38 0.40
1.8 0.30 0.35 0.67 0.35 3.47 0.37 1.02 1.45 0.32
1.9 0.45 0.23 0.67 0.39 3.29 0.21 1.06 1.46 0.24
2.0 0.54 0.11 0.66 0.42 3.13 0.10 1.08 1.44 0.16
2.1 0.61 0.02 0.63 0.45 2.98 0.02 1.08 1.40 0.06
minimum wages relaxes the no-shirking constraint for low-skill workers, and
as the employment of high-skill workers in low-tech jobs decreases, there is a
derived effect on the no-shirking condition for high-skill workers in high-tech
jobs.
Table 1 also shows the effects on the degree of over-education (Ω), the
average wage premium to high-skill workers (wHAwL ) and within group in-
equality (Θ).9 The increase in w reduces over-education and within-group
inequality. The average wage premium is increasing in wH/wL but decreas-
ing in Ω, and the net effect is a non-monotonic relation with the minimum
wage, increasing for some values of the minimum wage but falling if the
minimum wage is raised beyond a certain point.
3.2.2 Case 2: Mismatch when firms prefer high-skill workers in
low-tech jobs
In this case firms will not hire low-skill workers unless the no-shirking con-
dition is binding for high-skill workers in low-tech jobs. We assume the
condition is binding and that wages satisfy the following equations:
9These variables are defined as follows:
Ω =
NHL
NH +NL
wHA
wL
=
NHL
NH+NHL
wL +
NH
NH+NHL
wH
wL
Θ =
√
NHL
NH +NHL
(
wL − wHA
wHA
)2 +
NH
NH +NHL
(
wH − wHA
wHA
)2
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Table 2: Employment and wage effects of changes in the minimum wage
when firms prefer high-skill workers in low-tech jobs
(L = H = 1, eLL = 0.2, eHL = 0.5, eHH = 2, Y = 5N
0.5
H N
0.5
L , ρ = 0.1, δ = 1, p = 0.2)
w NLL NHL NL NH wH Ω N wHAw Θ
1.61 0.86 0.39 1.25 0.52 3.88 0.22 1.77 1.81 0.39
1.64 0.50 0.48 0.99 0.42 3.81 0.34 1.41 1.62 0.41
1.67 0.03 0.62 0.65 0.29 3.74 0.66 0.94 1.40 0.41
wH = eHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
+ (eHH − eHL)
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH
δ
(27)
w = wHL = eHL
δ + ρ+ p HH−NH−NHL
δ
(28)
From profit maximization we know that an increase in w leads to a
decline in wH and an increase in NH/NL. Equations (27)–(28) now imply
that NH must fall (substitute (28) into (27) and use the fact that wH − w
decreases) and hence that NL declines.
These implications are qualitatively the same as in the case without
mismatch. The presence of mismatch, however, adds a few extra results.
Using (28), it follows that a rise of w will increase aggregate employment of
high-skill workers (NH +NHL). Hence, the decline in low-skill employment
(NLL = NL−NHL) is exacerbated, the proportion of mismatched high-skill
workers (NHL/(NH +NHL) and the degree of over-education (Ω) go up, and
the wage premium, wHA/w will fall. Total employment (N = NH + NL)
must decrease since NH/NL increases and NH falls.
According to this case, the fall in minimum wages since the 1970s should
have led to increases in high-tech wages and the wage premium; the number
of high-tech jobs should also have increased but over-education should have
dropped, as should total employment of high-skill workers and within-group
inequality; low skill workers should have seen an increase in employment.
Numerical results are given in Table 2.10
10With one exception, the benchmark parameters are the same as in Table 1. The
exception is the cost of effort for low-skill workers which has been changed to eLL = 0.2
(compared to eLL = 1.3 in Table 1). The value of eLL does not affect the solution for
low-skill employment, but a lower value of eLL is used to ensure that the no-shirking
constraint is satisfied for low-skill workers at the implied levels of NLL and wL = w.
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4 Evidence
In this section we look at how the theoretical predictions of the model hold
up against the available evidence. We first introduce the data and provide
a descriptive analysis of the main trends in employment and earnings. This
is followed by the estimation of reduced form equations derived from the
model.
4.1 Measuring mismatch and match premia
The empirical relevance of the analysis in the previous section depends on
the extent of mismatch in the labor market. It is notoriously difficult to
measure skill requirements but the best existing source for the U.S. is the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The DOT reports expert assess-
ment of more than 12, 000 job titles. We take the General Education Devel-
opment (GED) index as our measure of skill requirements. The GED ranks
jobs in a scale of 1 to 6 (a GED of 4 roughly represents the skills acquired
through high-school). Jobs with GED greater than 4 are considered high-
tech. Unfortunately, the very detailed job classification of the DOT is not
available in any representative survey of earnings. We use the average GED
over 3-digit occupations as a proxy measure. The analysis is thus restricted
to the period 1973–2002, during which the 1970 and 1980 census occupa-
tional classifications were in use. During this period there were two data
issues of the DOT: 1977 and 1991. Other years are obtained through linear
extrapolation.
The skill requirements data were merged with the Current Population
Survey (CPS) earnings files. We use the education item to identify low-
(high school or less) and high-skill workers (at least some college). Figure 1
shows the distribution of employment across job and skill levels over the
period. The graph confirms the well studied movement toward higher levels
of education attainment. The share of employed workers with at least some
college went from around 33% in 1973 to over 58% in 2002. Less well known
is the steady increase in the share of high skill workers whose jobs have
requirements below their skill level, at least according to the DOT experts.
At the beginning of the period only 14.7% of workers were in this category;
toward the end of the period the percentage of over-educated workers had
increased by 10 percentage points.
Do job types matter for earnings, conditional on education attainment?
To answer this question we construct a wage sample from the CPS files.11
Our earnings variable is real weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours,
unless a separate and higher hourly rate is also reported. Earnings are
11In 1973–78 earnings questions were asked to the whole CPS sample in May. Starting
in 1979, earnings questions are asked every month to roughly a fourth of the sample (the
outgoing rotation groups).
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Employed Labor Force
deflated using the CPI (1979 = 100). The wage sample contains all wage
and salary workers employed full time who are between 18 and 65 years
of age. We weight the CPS data by hours worked and the appropriate
sampling weight. The CPS has undergone several changes that reduce its
consistency over time; details on the necessary adjustments on earnings and
other variables are provided in the appendix.
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Note: Source is CPS May−ORG. Allocated earnings are excluded.
Figure 2: Average Earnings of Full-time Workers
Figure 2 shows average real wages for workers separated into the same
four groups. Wages of high skill workers in high-tech jobs clearly stand out
as higher than those of all other groups. Low skill workers in the low-tech
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sector are at the bottom of the earnings distribution.12
4.2 Unemployment and mismatch
The analysis in section 3 generates reduced-form equations of the form
uL = f(w,
H
L
) (29)
uH = g(w,
H
L
) (30)
Ω = h(w,
H
L
) (31)
This general representation covers both cases 1 and 2, but the precise form
of the equations depends on whether firms prefer high- or low-skill workers
in low-tech jobs. The expression for uL, for instance, simplifies to uL = f(w)
in case 1 (firms prefer low-skill workers in low-tech jobs) and the expression
for uH to uH = g(w) in case 2 (firms prefer high-skill workers in low-tech
jobs).
Our regressions use log-linear versions of these equations but also include
a time trend to allow for the effects of technical change:
uL = γ0 + γ1t+ γ2 logw + γ3 log
H
L
(32)
uH = δ0 + δ1t+ δ2 logw + δ3 log
H
L
(33)
Ω = ρ0 + ρ1t+ ρ2 logw + ρ3 log
H
L
(34)
It is impossible to identify the structural parameters of the model from
these reduced forms, but the model implies the following parameter restric-
tions in cases 1 and 2:
• Case 1: γ2 < 0, γ3 = 0, δ2 R 0, δ3 R 0, ρ2 < 0, ρ3 > 0; 13
12The stylized model in section 3 has only two job categories and two skill levels, and
this and other simplifying assumptions imply that NLH = 0 and wHL = wLL. These
strong predictions will not hold if the simplifying assumptions are relaxed. With a range
of jobs and skills, for instance, college educated workers with low-tech jobs may hold jobs
that are, on average, better than the average job of correctly matched low-skill workers;
analogously, undereducated low-skill workers get high-tech jobs but the distribution of
these jobs may not be the same as the distribution of the jobs held by correctly matched
high-skill workers.
13The ambiguity of the sign of δ2 in case 1 was discussed in section 3. The sign of δ3
is ambiguous for related reasons. An increase in H/L reduces NH/H but raises NHL/H,
and the unemployment rate can go either way. The analytics are messy, but simulations
confirm the result.
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• Case 2: γ2 > 0, γ3 < 0, δ2 < 0, δ3 = 0, ρ2 > 0, ρ3 = 0.14
As discussed above, we have annual data for the period 1973–2002. One
possible strategy is to estimate equations (32)–(34) using time series varia-
tion for the whole sample. This approach has the advantage of being closest
in spirit to the macro model in section 3. The obvious drawback is that it
leaves us with only 30 observations. Also, states have the ability— which
they often use — to set a minimum wage that is above the federally man-
dated. Therefore, it is difficult to construct a good measure of the minimum
wage at the national level. An alternative strategy is to treat each state
as a separate economy. This approach yields a balanced panel of 51 units,
dramatically increasing degrees of freedom. It also allows for each state to
have its own minimum wage. However, the U.S. labor market is known to be
highly mobile and interconnected, and conditions that allow identification at
the national level might not hold for states. In particular, our specifications
treat the relative share of skilled workers (H/L) as exogenous. This assump-
tion is more likely to hold at the national level since workers already in the
work force find it costly to adjust their skill levels and adjustment through
new entries is slow. It is harder to make the same case at the state level.
Workers can commute or move to the states offering the best prospects for
employment and wages. If H/L is endogenous, the reduced form specifica-
tion should drop this variable. We offer this alternative specification as a
robustness check in our tables below.
Tables 3–5 report the estimates of the reduced form regressions (32)–
(34). Columns (1)–(2) in Tables 3–4 and (1)–(3) in Table 5 contain time
series estimates while columns (3)–(5) in Tables 3–4 and (4)–(8) in Table 5
contain panel regressions using state level data. We estimated the time
series regressions using both OLS and GLS-AR(1), since for both unem-
ployment rates the Durbin-Watson test-statistic rejects the null of no first
order autocorrelation in the error term at the 5% significance level. For
the over-education rate the same test falls in the inconclusive region. The
equation for over-education was estimated with and without a cyclical cor-
rection (the deviation of unemployment from its trend). Reassuringly, all
these different variations in the precise specification had only minor effects
on the coefficient estimates.
Looking first at the time series results, all three equations show a negative
effect of the minimum wage. Thus, we find no evidence that a rise in the
minimum wage will be associated with increased unemployment. Indeed,
while the effect may be statistically insignificant, the evidence suggests the
opposite: an increase in the minimum wage reduces unemployment and over-
education. These results are consistent with case 1, where firms prefer to
hire low-skill workers in low-tech jobs. Case 2, by contrast, implies a positive
14These parameter signs follow from equations (27)–(28).
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effect of the minimum wage on both low-skill unemployment and the degree
of over-education.
An increase in H/L produces a positive effect on both mismatch and
low- and high-skill unemployment. This again contradicts the implications
of case 2. The predictions of case 1 fare better: they are consistent with
the findings for the degree of over-education (positive effect predicted) and
high-skill unemployment (no prediction), but cannot account for the positive
effect on low-skill unemployment (zero effect predicted).
We now discuss the panel results. We used both fixed and random effects
estimators. The Hausman test rejected the consistency of the random effects
estimator in all cases15 and we report only the fixed effects results.
The panel regressions differ from the time series results in some respects.
The coefficients on the minimum wage are still negative in all three equa-
tions and are now statistically significant. Even though their values have
decreased somewhat, a much larger decrease can be observed for the coeffi-
cients on the composition of the labor supply (H/L) which in the equation
for high-skill unemployment drops to about one tenth of its value in the time
series specification (but remains statistically significant). This large fall may
be indicative of one of the main weaknesses of using the panel data approach.
Arguably, it may be reasonable to take the composition of the labor force as
exogenous for the US economy as a whole, but the exogeneity assumption
becomes questionable at the state level. The composition of the labor force
therefore becomes endogenous, and endogeneity bias may contribute to the
sharp reduction in the estimated coefficients: reverse causation suggests that
low levels of high-skill unemployment will attract high-skill workers and be
associated with a high value of H/L.
The panel estimates were robust to a range of specifications. We ran the
regressions with and without a separate time trend for each state and while
the state-specific trends improve the fit, the changes in the estimated coef-
ficients are small. We also experimented with specifications that included
a full set of year dummies (available upon request). The problem with this
specification is that the minimum wage effects can be identified only from
the small number of observations where state minimum wages exceed the
federal minimum (Burkhauser et al., 2000). Not surprisingly, these specifica-
tions showed insignificant (while still negative) effects of the minimum wage
on both unemployment rates. The coefficient estimate in the over-education
rate regression was still negative and significant.
Overall, the results of both the time series and panel regressions reject
the case-2 predictions and are largely consistent with case 1.
15Pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects estimates were are very close to each
other.
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Table 3: Reduced Form Regression for High-skill Unemployment
Time Series Regressions State Panel Regressions
OLS GLS-AR(1) FE FE+State Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Trend -0.003*** -0.003* -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
lnw -0.013 -0.026 -0.009** -0.009*** -0.009***
[0.043] [0.055] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
ln H
L
0.083** 0.076* 0.007*** 0.011***
[0.034] [0.042] [0.003] [0.003]
Constant 0.094*** 0.095** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.056***
[0.026] [0.034] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
Obs 30 30 1442 1442 1442
R-squared 0.332 0.154 0.134 0.195 0.187
DW 1.072 1.578
Hausman 27.216 234.602 226.37
Notes: Dependent variable is the unemployment rate for high-skill workers (0–1
range). Regression (2) assumes the error term follows an AR(1) process. Panel
regressions include 51 state fixed effects. Regressions (4)–(5) include state-specific
linear time trends. Standard errors in brackets. *** significant at 1% level; ** signif-
icant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 4: Reduced Form Regression for Low-skill Unemployment
Time Series Regressions State Panel Regressions
OLS GLS-AR(1) FE FE+State Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time Trend -0.010*** -0.008** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.000] [0.001] [-0.001]
lnw -0.051 -0.050 -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.021***
[0.094] [0.116] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
ln H
L
0.267*** 0.217** 0.038*** 0.048***
[0.074] [0.091] [0.005] [0.006]
Constant 0.246*** 0.215*** 0.122*** 0.129*** 0.104***
[0.057] [0.074] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007]
Obs 30 30 1442 1442 1442
R-squared 0.354 0.059 0.06 0.123 0.086
DW 0.838 1.621
Hausman 36.333 35.254 181.53
Notes: Dependent variable is the unemployment rate for low-skill workers (0–1 range).
Regression (2) assumes the error term follows an AR(1) process. Panel regressions
include 51 state fixed effects. Regressions (4)–(5) include state-specific linear time
trends. The variance matrix for the Hausman statistic for regression (3) had to be
obtained by using the disturbance variance estimate from the FE estimation only to
avoid a negative result. Standard errors in brackets. *** significant at 1% level; **
significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
4.3 The high-tech wage premium wH/wL
The wage premium in high-tech jobs will be affected by changes in the min-
imum wage. Our simplified model in section 3 has only two job categories,
low- and high-tech. A direct application of the model implies that wL = w,
and – assuming profit maximization under constant returns to scale – an
increase in the minimum wage therefore leads to a decline in wH , that is,
d log(wH/wL)/d logw < −1. With a range of different jobs and different
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Table 5: Reduced Form Regression for Over-education Rate
Time Series Regressions State Panel Regressions
OLS GLS-AR(1) FE FE+State Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time Trend -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.000*** -0.000** 0.001** 0.001** 0.004***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
lnw -0.046* -0.047* -0.012 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
ln H
L
0.213*** 0.202*** 0.123*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.093***
[0.019] [0.022] [0.023] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
uL (HP-dev) 0.058 0.019 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.153***
[0.056] [0.041] [0.017] [0.014] [0.018]
Constant 0.294*** 0.289*** 0.228*** 0.234*** 0.233*** 0.232*** 0.230*** 0.182***
[0.015] [0.016] [0.019] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Obs 30 30 30 1442 1442 1442 1442 1442
R-squared 0.981 0.982 0.880 0.821 0.822 0.88 0.882 0.799
DW 0.778 0.818 1.598
Hausman 17.579 17.864 1383.221 1425.750 6036.46
Notes: Dependent variable is the over-education rate (range 0–1). Regression (3) assumes the error term follows an AR(1)
process. Panel regressions include 51 state fixed effects. Regressions (6)–(8) include state-specific linear time trends. The
variance matrix for the Hausman statistic for regressions (4) and (5) had to be obtained by using the disturbance variance
estimate from the FE estimation only to avoid a negative result. Standard errors in brackets. *** significant at 1% level; **
significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
skills, however, a change in the minimum wage will generate a cascade of
changes in the wage distribution. One would still expect the average wage
for the subset of low-tech jobs to move in the same direction as the minimum
wage, and the elasticity d log(wH/wL)/d logw should be negative. Its value,
however, will depend on the distribution of skills and jobs and on the chosen
delineation of the subsets of high- and low-tech jobs.
We estimated a reduced form relation with the high-tech wage premium
as the dependent variable and the minimum wage, the composition of the
labor supply and a time trend as regressors:
log
wH,t
wL,t
= β0 + β1t+ β2 logw + β3 log
H
L
(35)
The results are in Table 6. Column 1 has the baseline time series specifi-
cation. Column 2 adds a cyclical correction (the deviation of the unemploy-
ment rate from its trend) since the adjustment speeds of both wages and
employment in response to shocks may be different for high-and low-tech
jobs. The DW statistic rejects the null of no autocorrelation, so in Column
3 we offer GLS estimates that assume an AR(1) process for the error term.
The three time series specifications yield virtually identical results16. We
get a negative and statistically highly significant coefficient on the minimum
wage, and the negative effect of an increase in the relative supply of high-
skill labor is also what one would expect. The positive time trend, finally, is
consistent with skill-biased technical change and/or power-biased technical
change.17
16We also estimated the same set of specifications on a composition-adjusted relative
wage dependent variable. These results are available upon request and very close to those
of the unadjusted variable.
17The case for skill-biased technological change has been challenged by, among others,
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The panel regressions in columns (4)–(7) differ in whether they include
cyclical corrections and state-specific time trends. The effects of these varia-
tions in specification are very minor. The panel results, however, differ from
the time series: in the panel regressions, an increase in the relative labor
supply is associated with a rise in the wage premium. We see this reversal
of the sign as the result of the endogeneity of the relative labor supply at
the state level. We estimated the same specification omitting the relative
supply variable (column (8) in the table). The minimum wage coefficient
remains negative and significant.
Table 6: Reduced Form Regression for the Hi/Low-tech Log Wage Gap
Time Series Regressions State Panel Regressions
OLS GLS-AR(1) FE FE+State Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time Trend 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
lnw -0.179*** -0.182*** -0.169* -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.070***
[0.064] [0.064] [0.083] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
ln H
L
-0.231*** -0.257*** -0.233*** 0.018* 0.022** 0.019* 0.025**
[0.050] [0.057] [0.069] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011]
uL (HP-dev) 0.146 0.301** -0.123** -0.126** -0.102**
[0.145] [0.141] [0.059] [0.052] [0.051]
Constant 0.286*** 0.273*** 0.284*** 0.391*** 0.393*** 0.396*** 0.399*** 0.386***
[0.038] [0.041] [0.055] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012]
Obs 30 30 30 1442 1442 1442 1442 1442
R-squared 0.928 0.931 0.919 0.211 0.214 0.406 0.409 0.406
DW 1.07 0.964 1.653
Hausman 1.353 1.305 946.012 951.829 943.81
Notes: Dependent variable is ln
wH
wL
. Regression (3) assumes the error term follows an AR(1) process.
Panel regressions include 51 state fixed effects. Regressions (6)–(8) include state-specific linear time trends.
Standard errors in brackets. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10%
level.
4.4 Job composition and the elasticity of substitution
Changes in the relative wage have implications for the job composition.
Assuming a CES production function, we have
Yt = [αt(atNH,t)ρ + (1− αt)(btNL,t)ρ]1/ρ
where again NH,t and NL,t refer to jobs and not to worker types. The
parameters at and bt represent high-tech and low-tech labor augmenting
technical change. The constant economy-wide elasticity of substitution is
σ = 11−ρ .
The first-order conditions for profit maximization imply that
log
wH,t
wL,t
= log
αt
1− αt + ρ log
at
bt
+ (ρ− 1) log NH,t
NL,t
(Howell, 1999; Card and DiNardo, 2002). Skott and Guy (2007) and Guy and Skott (2008)
suggest that there is stronger evidence for “power-biased” technological change and that,
like skill bias, a power bias can increase both wage and employment inequality. Power-
biased technical change produces shifts in the no-shirking conditions, and the positive
trend could reflect both skill-biased and power-biased technical change.
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which can be rewritten as
log
wH,t
wL,t
=
1
σ
[
Dt − log NH,t
NL,t
]
(36)
where Dt measures technological shifts favoring high-tech jobs. Substituting
a time trend for the unobserved variable D, we get18
log
wH,t
wL,t
=
1
σ
[
A+B t− log NH,t
NL,t
]
(37)
Equation (37) has been used to estimate the elasticity of substitution (for
example Katz and Murphy (1992)). Using our notation, a single regression is
run with log wHAwL as the dependent variable and log
NH+NHL
NLL
as the measure
of relative employment.19 We have replicated this procedure with our data
set and time period. The results — which are available on request — are
similar to those found in the literature (our estimate for σ is 1.75 compared
to 1.57 in Autor et al. (2008)).
From our perspective, there are two problems with these regressions.
When there is mismatch, the theoretically correct specification regresses
log wH,twL,t on log
NH,t
NL,t
, rather than log wHAwL on log
NH+NHL
NLL
. Secondly, by disre-
garding wage setting, the regressions implicitly assume that relative employ-
ment can be taken as exogenous. This exogeneity assumption is reasonable
if the labor markets are competitive and the supplies of high-and low-skill
labor are inelastic. It becomes questionable, however, if wage formation is
governed by efficiency wages and the degree of mismatch is endogenously
determined. Thus, the estimates of the elasticity of substitution in Autor
et al. (2008) and other studies that follow the same approach may be biased.
Both of these problems can be addressed and an alternative estimate
of the substitution elasticity can be obtained by combining equations (35)–
(37). Substituting for the relative wage in equation (37) and rearranging,
we get a reduced-form equation for the job ratio,
log
NH
NL
= A− σβ0 + (B − σβ1)t− β2σ logw − β3σ log H
L
(38)
The elasticity of substitution can be recovered by comparing the param-
eter estimates in (38) and (35). The regression results for equation (38) are
in table (7). As with the relative wage equation, the panel results differ
substantially from the time series but are likely to be biased. The time
series regressions produce small and statistically insignificant estimates of
18The derivation of (37) follows that in Katz and Murphy (1992), except for the mod-
ifications arising from our distinction between job characteristics and worker types. Also
see Katz and Autor (1999); Autor et al. (2008).
19More precisely, the dependent variable is the composition-adjusted log wage gap be-
tween college and high-school educated workers and the relative employment measure uses
labor quantities in efficiency units.
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both β2σ and β3σ. Also, the DW statistics show the presence of first order
autocorrelation in the error term. Therefore, we are left with the estimates
in column (3). The implied values of σ and even its sign depend on which
ratio is used. Using the results in tables (6) and (7) we get two σ estimates
of −0.1170.169 ≈ −0.69 and 0.1430.233 ≈ 0.61. These magnitudes, however, are cal-
culated with substantial error and neither estimate is statistically different
from zero when the standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
This low elasticity of substitution between labor inputs is consistent with
the findings in Card et al. (1999).
Table 7: Reduced Form Regression for the Log Job Composition Ratio
Time Series Regressions State Panel Regressions
OLS GLS-AR(1) FE FE+State Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time Trend 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.013** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.002 -0.002 0.014***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
lnw -0.077 -0.077 -0.117 -0.014 -0.014 -0.030 -0.030 -0.038
[0.124] [0.127] [0.160] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.024]
ln H
L
-0.083 -0.082 0.143 0.464*** 0.469*** 0.454*** 0.461***
[0.097] [0.112] [0.137] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.018]
uL (HP-dev) -0.005 0.348 -0.176* -0.169** 0.274***
[0.286] [0.263] [0.091] [0.086] [0.102]
Constant -0.777*** -0.776*** -0.635*** -0.528*** -0.525*** -0.518*** -0.514*** -0.752***
[0.075] [0.080] [0.109] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.024]
Obs 30 30 30 1442 1442 1442 1442 1442
R-squared 0.984 0.984 0.962 0.853 0.854 0.876 0.876 0.815
DW 1.026 1.028 1.779
Hausman 9.263 9.110 982.868 986.478 1610.25
Notes: Dependent variable is ln
NH
NL
. Regression (3) assumes the error term follows an AR(1) process. Panel regressions
include 51 state fixed effects. Regressions (6)–(8) include state-specific linear time trends. The variance matrix for the
Hausman statistic for regressions (4) and (5) had to be obtained by using the disturbance variance estimate from the
FE estimation only to avoid a negative result. Standard errors in brackets. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at
5% level; * significant at 10% level.
4.5 Spurious correlation?
The correlation between the minimum wage and wage inequality has been
noted in previous studies. It has also been suggested, however, that this
correlation may be spurious and that shifts in the demand for skills, rather
than autonomous changes in non-market factors, have been central to the
movements in relative wages and employment.
Is there any direct evidence of spurious correlation? Autor et al. (2008)
point to the existence of a time series correlation not just between the min-
imum wage and lower tail inequality (the 50/10 ratio) but also between the
minimum wage and upper tail inequality (90/50). The latter correlation,
they argue, is “unlikely to provide causal estimates of minimum wage im-
pacts” (p.311). Instead, this correlation suggests that causal influence of
minimum wages in these regressions should be discounted. We do not find
this conclusion persuasive.
Our model, first, implies that changes in the minimum wage has ripple
effects on over-education and wages throughout the wage distribution. We
would expect the effects to be stronger at the lower tail than at the upper
tail of the distribution, but there will be some effect at the upper tail too. In
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line with this expectation, the results reported by Autor et al. (2008) show
much stronger effects at the lower tail than at the upper tail: the coefficients
on the minimum wage are -.23 and -.10, respectively. Had the coefficients
been reversed — with the stronger effect on upper tail inequality — then
it could have been seen as evidence of spurious correlation, but it is not
obvious that a coefficient of -0.10 is too high to be plausible.
One should still be cautious about causal attribution, in particular if
there are reasons to suspect that changes in the minimum wage may be
determined endogenously by labor market conditions. It could be argued
that the decline in the minimum wage reflects the decrease in the demand
for low-skill workers and that the slide in the real value of the minimum
wage was necessary to prevent rising low-skill unemployment. Our model
questions this premise: low-skill employment may suffer as a result of a
falling minimum wage.
Lastly, changes in the minimum wage are related to political pressures
and general ideological trends. These trends have generated a range of non-
market changes, from labor market legislation and declining unionization
to the deregulation of the financial industry. The estimated effect of the
minimum wage may be capturing the influence of these other non-market
factors. This potential problem of interpretation, however, does not imply
that non-market changes merely reflect market fundamentals.
5 Conclusion
The theoretical model in this paper is highly stylized and clearly tells—at
best—a small part of the story behind increasing inequality. Several results,
however, stand out and may play a role in a more elaborate account of the
observed changes.
We have shown that if firms prefer to fill low-tech jobs with low-skill
workers rather than with over-educated high-skill workers then “aggregate
monopsonistic elements” arise naturally in a model with mismatch. These
monopsonistic elements imply that a fall in the minimum wage can have ad-
verse effects on aggregate employment as well as on the degree of mismatch
and the rate of underemployment of high-skill workers. A fall in the mini-
mum wage can produce a rise in both within and between group inequality
and low-skill workers may suffer a double blow of declining employment and
wages.
The evidence reported in section 4 suggest that these theoretical results
may be empirically relevant. There is strong evidence of mismatch in the
labor market, and the degree of mismatch has been increasing, especially
in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the monopsonistic implications of the
theoretical model are supported by US data for 1973–2002. Our regressions
suggest that the fall in the minimum wage led to a deterioration of the
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employment and relative wage of low-skill workers and an increase in the
underemployment of high-skill workers.
A Appendix: basic processing of May/ORG CPS
and DOT Data
Data on skill requirements comes from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
4th Edition (1977) and revised 4th Edition (1991). We use the dataset
compiled by Levy and Murnane (1992) that contains weighted averages of
three GED scores (language, reasoning, and math) by occupation and sex
using both the 1970 and 1980 3-digit occupational classifications. Only
the highest GED is binding so we drop the other two. Scores for years
other than 1977/91 are linearly extrapolated. The 1970 and 1980 Census
occupational classifications are available in the CPS only during the period
1973–2002. Thus, we use the May CPS for 1973–78 and the merged outgoing
rotation groups for 1979–2002. The general inclusion criteria are: age in the
range 18–65, to have worked in the past, and potential experience between
1 and 40 years (this inclusion criteria will be referred to as counts sample).
Calculations that involve earnings are done using the standard earnings
weight multiplied by usual weekly hours.
Our wage variable is the log of real hourly earning in 1979 dollars (de-
flated using the CPI-U-RS). Hourly earnings are weekly earnings divided by
usual weekly hours with the exception of cases in which a separate higher
hourly wage is reported. After 1994 individuals are allowed to answer that
their hours vary. We use a simple regression imputation approach to as-
sign hours to those individuals. No allocated earnings are utilized, however.
During the period 1989–93 the allocation flags fail to identify most imputed
earnings. Following Lemieux (2006), we use the unedited earnings variable
to identify and drop unflagged allocated earnings. Topcoded earnings are
winsorized using a 1.4 factor.
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